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Value Unfunded 
Pension Liabilities? 
Jeremy I. Bulow, Randall MBrck, and 
Lawrence Summers 
The question of how the stock market values pension assets and lia- 
bilities is of central importance to corporate decision makers, financial 
economists, and economists concerned with level of national savings. 
If investors treat pension debt differently from other forms of debt in 
valuing firms, prudent  value-maximizing managers  should recognize 
these differences and adjust their pension funding policies accordingly. 
A convincing demonstration that market valuations failed to take ac- 
count of pension assets or liabilities would either challenge prevailing 
theories of  market efficiency and rational  valuation  or force a reex- 
amination of conventional views about effective ownership of pension 
claims.  Finally, if potential  beneficiaries of  pensions recognized  the 
value of  the pensions  and adjusted  their savings accordingly, but no 
comparable adjustment occurred because holders of pension liabilities 
did not recognize their liabilities, or were confident of  their ability to 
shift them to some other source such as the PBGC, then pensions would 
reduce national savings. These effects might be quite significant. Con- 
tributions to private pensions represented 58% of  personal savings in 
1977. 
A number of empirical studies including Oldfield (1977), Feldstein 
and Seligman (1981), Feldstein and MBrck (1983), and Gersovitz (1980) 
have attempted to study the market’s valuation of pension liabilities 
using cross-sectional valuation models. Other analysts have taken the 
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position that the overwhelming empirical evidence in  support of the 
hypothesis of  market efficiency makes studying the market valuation 
of pension assets and liabilities irrelevant. This position seems unwar- 
ranted. A  great deal of controversy  as reflected  in  Modigliani-Cohn 
(1979), Summers (1981), and French et al. (1983) focuses on the effects 
of inflation on firms’ nominal assets and liabilities. Furthermore, if the 
supposition of  rational  valuation  is accepted, studies of  the market 
valuation effect of changes in pension liabilities offer an ideal meth- 
odology for examining the true ownership of pension claims. 
In  adding  to  the  already  fairly  extensive  empirical  literature  on 
the valuation of  pension assets and liabilities, this paper makes two 
significant innovations.  First,  we  report  results  using  a  “variable 
effect”  event study methodology for studying the valuation  of pen- 
sion claims. This methodology is far superior to the traditional cross- 
sectional valuation  model approach for examining the determinants 
of market valuations. Indeed, we suggest that identification is highly 
problematic using standard approaches. Second, following recent work 
by  Bulow  (1982),  Lazear (1985),  and others we recognize  that pen- 
sions may be only one aspect of complicated contracts through which 
firms offer workers deferred compensation. If  deferred compensation 
is an important aspect of  the labor market, one would  expect it  to 
leave traces in  the market  valuations  of  otherwise  equivalent firms 
with demographically  different  labor forces.  We  examine this issue 
using both the standard cross-section and the “variable effect” event 
study methodology. In addition to these innovations, the availability 
of  a  larger  and  more  recent  data  set  made  it  possible  for  us  to 
replicate the estimates presented in earlier studies and examine their 
robustness . 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 4.1 examines the theo- 
retical relationships between pension assets and liabilities and the mar- 
ket valuation of firms. A number of possible reasons why unfunded 
pension liabilities may not reduce equity valuations dollar for dollar 
are considered. Section 4.2 presents evidence on the relationship be- 
tween pension obligations and market valuations using standard cross- 
sectional techniques. Other forms of deferred compensation are also 
considered. Our doubts about cross-sectional methodologies are also 
discussed. Section 4.3 presents estimates of the effect of pension ob- 
ligations on  market  valuation  using the variable  effect  event  study 
methodology. We  argue that this methodology provides a superior basis 
for testing market valuation issues than does the standard approach. 
While the available evidence is weak, it does tend to corroborate stan- 
dard theories regarding the economic effects of pension obligations. 
Finally, section 4.4 presents our conclusions and suggests directions 
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4.1  Valuing  a Firm’s Net Pension Wealth 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to examine the extent 
to which  market  valuations  of  firm  equity accurately  reflect  firms’ 
pension positions.  These studies have typically not discussed in any 
detail how rational investors should combine a firm’s regular balance 
sheet and its pension  position  in valuing it.  It  turns  out, however, 
that  because  of  complexities  engendered by  the legal nature  of  the 
pension  contract, the nature of  the long-term implicit contracts be- 
tween workers and firms, and the tax code, the valuation of pension 
assets and  liabilities is quite  a subtle issue.  This section begins by 
sketching  a  naive  benchmark  model  for  evaluating  firms’ pension 
positions  and  then  considers  five qualifications to it. These qualifi- 
cations provide the basis for much of the empirical discussion in the 
next two sections. 
Perhaps the simplest model of a defined benefit plan is the “consol- 
idated balance  sheet”  approach.  In this approach, pension liabilities 
are defined on a “quit”  basis-what  workers would receive if  they 
individually quit the firm today, or their vested benefits-and  those 
obligations are treated like a general corporate liability. Pension assets 
are similarly treated as a general corporate asset, so any difference 
between pension assets and liabilities is part of net shareholder wealth. 
On this view unfunded pension liabilities should reduce firms’ market 
value dollar for dollar. 
4.1.1 
The first qualification to this simple model is that it does not take 
into account the special legal nature of the pension liability. Prior to 
ERISA employees’ pension benefits were nonrecourse claims against 
corporate pension assets. Because of the workers’ nonrecourse claim 
we could think of the firm’s net pension wealth as being an option on 
the fund’s assets, F, with an exercise price equal to V, vested benefits. 
If we think of the firm and its employees as constantly negotiating over 
the levels of F and V so that either side always had the ability to force 
immediate exercise of the option, then the firm’s net pension wealth 
would be max (0,F - V) and workers’ net pension wealth would be 
min(F, V). 
With the passage of  ERISA firms are liable for varying sums de- 
pending on the level of guaranteed benefits G (which in terminations 
in the first few years of PBGC existence averaged  .85 of  vested ben- 
efits), accrued benefits A (which because they include nonvested ben- 
efits slightly exceed vested benefits), the amount of money in the pen- 
sion fund F, and the market value of the firm’s equity E. 
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Following Bulow (1982) we can make a table of the firm’s total pen- 
sion obligations and unfunded liability as a function of these four vari- 
ables (see unnumbered table below). 
Note that in case 1, a severely underfunded plan, the firm’s pension 
liability is less than the present value of  workers’ benefits. The differ- 
ence is made up by the PBGC through its “insurance”  program, and 
is often referred to as the “pension put.” 
Level of  Funding  Pension Liability  Net Firm Liability 
(1)  F + .3E < G  F  + .3E 
(2)  G < F + .3E < G + .3E  G 
(3) G<F<A  F 
(4)  A < F  A 
.3E 
G-F 
0 
F -  A (overfunded) 
An empirical implication of the valuation model implied in the table 
is that the firms with overfunded pensions (where F > A)  are the re- 
sidual claimants in their plans and should benefit from increases in F 
(through plan asset growth) and decreases in A (caused by interest rate 
increases that decrease the present value of accrued benefits). Again 
in the case where G < F + .3E  < G + .3E the firm is the residual 
claimant. However, in cases 1 and 3, for vastly underfunded plans and 
for those with G < A < F,  the firm is not the residual  claimant and 
should be unaffected by changes in pension asset and liability values. 
Of  course, if  we realistically  assume that pension  policy  cannot be 
instantaneously revised, then the firm may be a partial gainer or loser 
from changes in pension  asset and liability valuation. For example, 
following Sharpe (1976) one might view the firm as having a call option 
on the assets of the fund Fat  an exercise price A, so changes in F and 
A change the value of  that option but not dollar for dollar with A-F. 
On average, though, we would expect firms with overfunded pension 
plans to have valuations that are more sensitive to pension asset and 
liability values  than firms with less well funded plans.  We  test this 
hypothesis in the next two sections. 
4.1.2  Implicit Contracting 
A second qualification to the benchmark analysis of pension obli- 
gations is that one may be reluctant to take literally all the aspects of 
the employment contract. For example, firms often raise the benefits 
of already retired workers and workers may find their pension benefits 
much higher if they leave a firm just after qualifying for early retirement 
rather than just before. A literal view of  individuals’ pension wealth 
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firm and that a worker accumulates a large amount of wealth the day 
he becomes  eligible for early retirement.  Neither assumption seems 
very satisfying. 
Bulow and Scholes (1983) make the argument that in fact compen- 
sation is negotiated cross-sectionally between a firm and its employees, 
either explicitly through a union or implicitly. Workers bargain for part 
of the quasi rents earned by firms and have some leeway as to how to 
split those rents among themselves. Their model allows for the pos- 
sibility that sometimes a worker will be paid much more than marginal 
product, such as when retirement benefits are raised or early retirement 
eligibility is attained. Their measure of worker compensation in a period 
is the salary, pension, and other benefits legally accrued during the 
period (the workers’ extra compensation if  they all left at the end of 
the period rather than at its beginning) plus any increment in the present 
value of the quasi rents that the workers expect to be able to negotiate 
with the firm. In particular, it is widely believed that workers benefit 
from their firm’s reinvestment in their industry.  Bulow and Scholes 
argue the reason is that even if  such investment did not change the 
marginal product  of  the last worker employed  in  the firm, average 
product would be greater and the workers would be in a position as a 
group to negotiate greater compensation. Similarly, increases in pen- 
sion assets may affect the workers’ ability to bargain with their em- 
ployers. A company with extra cash in its pension fund may find its 
workers are able to bargain for a better deal, implying that part of any 
gain on the pension portfolio will find its way to the workers. 
The Bulow-Scholes model has the empirical implication that workers 
share in the gain or loss on the pension portfolio and, therefore, pension 
gains and losses should be only partially reflected in stock prices. It 
most clearly differs from the first qualification in its prediction of the 
treatment of changes in net pension assets for vastly overfunded plans 
(F >> A) where the first qualification would predict that all incremental 
gains would go to stockholders. 
4.1.3  Pensions and Other Aspects of Compensation Arrangements 
Third, it is extremely difficult to isolate pensions from the rest of the 
compensation contract. For example, a firm may have more generous 
severance arrangements for workers who leave before the early retire- 
ment date. If so, the extra pay for staying until early retirement is much 
less than  implied by  the pension  plan  because  the  gain in  pension 
benefits is mitigated by a loss in severance pay. Other benefits such as 
health benefits and (in universities especially) college tuition may also 
be spread unevenly across an employee’s career. Thus looking at pen- 
sion wealth in isolation may be an error if pension wealth is correlated 
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Most important, pension contributions are less than 10% of salary 
for most firms and have been decreasing for the past 2 years. Clearly 
small percentage changes in salary can cancel much larger percentage 
changes in pensions. 
The implication of all this is that we know little about how the pension 
obligation correlates with other elements of the compensation package. 
If there is a correlation between firms with large gross pension liabilities 
and firms with older workers, say, and older workers get overpaid 
regardless of  the  nature of  the firm’s pension  plan,  then  a relation 
between large pension liabilities and low firm valuation may be due to 
the correlation of those liabilities with the age composition of the firm’s 
labor force. In section 4.2 we make preliminary tests of whether steep 
wage/age profiles and older labor forces are correlated with firms’ stock 
market value. 
4.1.4  Tax Effects 
The fourth issue which causes significant conceptual difficulty in val- 
uing a firm’s net claim on its pension fund is taxes. For simplicity we 
will confine our analysis here primarily to the case of  an overfunded 
plan, making the assumption that the firm can use any excess assets 
to reduce future pension costs, and thus bear the entire risk of changes 
in pension asset and liability values. Therefore, we will be placing an 
upper bound on the value of an increment in pension assets to a firm. 
We  limit our discussions to three tax issues that have not received 
wide attention among pension researchers. The first is an explicit cal- 
culation of the value of being overfunded. The second is the implica- 
tions of that calculation for changes in pension asset and liability val- 
uation. The third is simply that overfunding a pension fund can serve 
many  of  the  same purposes  as a stock repurchase, with better  tax 
implications. We  use as an arbitrary benchmark a plan which is always 
funded at the level of accrued benefits. (Defined contribution plans are 
generally like this.) We  compare such a plan with one where the plan 
is funded at some level F(s)  at time s where F(s)  may differ from the 
level of accrued benefits. Then it is easy to show that the tax advantage 
to having a defined benefit plan is equal to the present value of interest 
earned on pension assets in excess of pension liabilities, times the tax 
rate on pension contributions. 
To  illustrate this point we introduce the following notation: 
Let r = 
71  = 
72 = 
F(s) = 
B(s) = 
pre-tax market interest rate 
marginal tax rate of  the firm 
implicit tax rate the firm pays on investment income; that is, 
its after-tax discount rate is r(1 -  T~) 
amount of money in pension fund at time s 
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We  compare the tax benefits of beginning a plan at time t, making 
an initial contribution F(t),  and subsequently operating with funding at 
level F(s)  versus making an initial contribution of A(t)  and subsequently 
remaining fully funded at level A(s). 
With funding maintained at level F(s)  the present value of after-tax 
future pension contributions needed to supply a benefit stream B(s)  is 
The present  value  of  contributions to a plan  that is always fully 
funded is 
m 
(2)  (1 -  T~)A(~)  + (1 -  T~)  I  [A(s)  + B(s) - rA(s)]  e -4’  T2)(S-rf)ds 
The tax saving from funding at level F is simply (2)  minus (1) or 
I 
(3)  tax saving = m2(l -  T1)  [F(s) -  A(s)]e-r(1-T2)(s-r)ds  1 
It should be clear that the way to maximize (3)  is to set F(s)  as high 
as possible at each moment. In such a simple model, then, firms will 
always be up against their IRS funding limitation. 
What is the implication for firm valuation of a shock to the value of 
F(s)  or A(s)?  First, consider a rise in F(s).  With increased excess fund- 
ing the firm would get larger tax benefits. It would amortize its “ex- 
perience gain”  on asset performance as slowly as possible. If amor- 
tization occurs over T years, annual pension contributions will drop 
by rAFi(1 - crT)  where AF  is the gain in the value of fund assets. 
The present value to the firm of its savings is 
(4)  (1 -  T~)  (1 - e-.T) 
. 
This formula  is  most  understandable  by  considering some extreme 
cases. First, assume T~  = 0: there is no tax paid on investment income 
earned outside the pension fund. Then there is no advantage to funding 
per se and an increase in F of one dollar will raise firm value by 1 - 
T~,  the amount of money the firm would get if it were able to immediately 
withdraw the extra dollar from  the  plan.  Second, consider the oft- 
considered case where T~  = T, = T: the implicit tax rate on corporate 
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rate of  T, (generally considered 46%). This view is consistent with that 
of Miller’s (1977) model of  corporate  finance. Furthermore, assume 
that T = m;  the increment in pension assets does not have to be am- 
ortized and the firm may  be overfunded by an extra dollar forever. 
Then the increment in firm value is AF. Of this gain of AF, then, AF(l 
-  T)  is created because the value of assets in the pension fund (which 
holds pre-tax assets) has risen by AF. Also, because those AF dollars 
will earn returns of  rAF each year forever instead of  r(1 - T)AF  as 
nonpension  assets would earn, there is an annual saving in pension 
costs of ~TAF  because of the tax-sheltered nature of the pension returns. 
The after-tax value of this saving is r~aF(1  -  T). If we discount this 
saving at the after-tax rate of r(l -  T), we find that the present value 
of the tax saving from being able to remain overfunded forever is 
mAF(1 -  T) 
= TAF. 
r(l -  T) 
If  in fact we assume 15 years’ amortization of excess funding, that 
T, = T~  = .46, and that pre-tax interest rates are lo%, then (4) implies 
that a firm’s value should rise by approximately 72 cents for each dollar 
its pension assets rise in value. There is an asymmetry on the loss side 
in that while excess assets will be defunded as slowly as possible asset 
shortfalls will be made up as quickly as allowed. Of course, if a funding 
deficiency could be made up instantly then the cost to a firm of a decline 
in  the value of its pension assets would be 54 cents. Because of the 
asymmetry firms have a mitigated incentive to establish “dedicated” 
bond portfolios which preclude gains or losses on a fraction of their 
pension obligations. 
Changes in the value of pension liabilities are a bit more complicated. 
The reason is that funding limitations are based on the book value of 
liabilities rather than market value. If interest rates rise, causing the 
value of  liabilities to fall, in the short run the firm will be more over- 
funded than before. This overfunding will only be recognized for fund- 
ing limitation purposes through the channel of the firm’s pension assets 
earning a return greater than the plan’s actuarial rate. As these greater 
returns are earned each year they must then be amortized as experi- 
enced gains. Thus changes in liability values will end up being effec- 
tively amortized more slowly than changes in asset values and a slightly 
higher coefficient would be expected in the sensitivity of firm value to 
changes in pension liabilities than to changes in pension assets. 
Finally, we note the large amount of corporate stock and other assets 
held in  private pension plans. Numerous firms hold pension assets in 
excess of the market value of firm equity. Because pension contribu- 
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pension fund may involve a transfer of corporate wealth from stock- 
holders  to employees, pension  overfunding  seems to dominate cor- 
porate share repurchases on two grounds. First is the deductibility of 
contributions,  and second the fund can use money  to hold a wider 
variety of  assets than just the firm’s own stock. As such, we might 
expect excess pension fund contributions to provide a signaling role 
much like that of dividends and repurchases. However, we leave this 
last point for future research. 
4.1.5  Investor Rationality 
A fifth reason that changes in firms’ pension  assets and liabilities 
may not be reflected dollar for dollar in stock prices is that the market 
may be inefficient in valuing pension liabilities. While this reason may 
seem implausible, concern over the effect of large pension contributions 
on reported  earnings may be  one of  the reasons  that managements 
often contribute much less to their pension funds than they are per- 
mitted by IRS regulations. 
Other studies such as French et al. (1983) have indicated that it is 
difficult to find the effect of the change in the market value of conven- 
tional debt on stock prices. Pension debt, which does not appear on 
corporate balance sheets and has only recently appeared in any form 
in the footnotes, may thus be discounted by the market because of its 
complexity. 
In this section we have discussed a number of reasons why a naive 
model of changes in a firm’s net pension wealth being reflected dollar 
for dollar in stock market valuation may fail. In particular,  we have 
discussed the details of  ERISA, implicit contracting issues, the cor- 
relation between pension and nonpension  compensation, tax effects, 
and investor rationality in valuing pension claims. In the subsequent 
sections of the paper we attempt to estimate what in fact is the relation 
between a firm’s pension assets and liabilities and the market value of 
its equity. 
4.2  Cross-sectional Valuation Models 
The extent to which share prices reflect unfunded pension obligations 
is a key issue in considering the effect of private pensions on national 
savings. It has been argued (Feldstein  1978) that if  unfunded pension 
liabilities are not fully reflected in stock prices, equity owners will save 
less and consume more than they would in a world where perceptions 
were correct. National savings might thus be reduced by the introduc- 
tion of private pensions. 
For this reason  and because  of  intrinsic  interest  as an aspect of 
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Gersovitz  (1980), Feldstein  and  Seligman (1981), and  Feldstein  and 
MBrck (1983) have endeavored to explore this issue. These efforts have 
focused on listing variables likely to be determinants of a firm’s market 
value. If an effect of unfunded pension liabilities on market value can 
be detected after these other likely factors are controlled for, the studies 
conclude that unfunded pension obligations influence share prices. 
Feldstein and MBrck (1983), for example, model a firm’s market value 
(V) per dollar of net assets (A)  as depending on the firm’s future earnings 
potential, its riskiness, its leverage, and (perhaps)  its pension Obligations. 
(6)  - F (future earnings potential, risk, 
V 
A  leverage, unfunded pension liability). 
_- 
As proxies for future earnings potential,  they  use the firm’s current 
earnings  (E), its historical growth rate in earnings (GROW), and its 
research and development spending (RD).  They employ the firm’s beta 
as a measure of risk, and the market value of its debt as a fraction of 
net assets as a leverage indicator. The firm’s unfunded vested pension 
liability (UVPL) per dollar of net assets is used to measure its pension 
obligations. Thus Feldstein and MBrck ended up estimating 
+ E. 
They found a coefficient of about minus one on unfunded vested pen- 
sion liabilities, and concluded that an added dollar of net pension ob- 
ligations depresses the firm’s market value by about one dollar. Their 
study was plagued by fairly difficult data problems-primarily  by the 
use of  only very coarse inflation adjustments and by  the very small 
size of their sample. 
Preliminary to this study, we replicated the Feldstein/MBrck regres- 
sions using a much larger body of  more recent data. Although their 
result could be reproduced, it was quite unstable. Seemingly innocuous 
changes in the sample made it come or go. The estimated coefficients 
on the proxies for future earnings potential-especially on GROW- 
were also disturbingly unstable. 
In this section, we shall point out severe problems inherent in the 
cross-sectional valuation methodology used by these previous authors. 
We  then  suggest alternative, more  satisfactory  cross-sectional  esti- 
mating equations.  Estimation of  these  equations yields results  con- 
sistent with Feldstein and MBrck’s conclusion that pension liabilities 
are largely reflected in a firms’ market valuation. 
DEBT  UVPL 
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4.2.1  Problems with the Cross-sectional Valuation 
The lack of robustness of the Feldstein-MBrck equations when rep- 
licated for a larger sample using more recent data calls into question 
the validity of the cross-sectional valuation methodology used by them 
and other authors. This inference is supported by the conflicting evi- 
dence found in previous cross-sectional valuation  studies. Feldstein 
and Seligman (1981), for example, obtain results similar to those of 
Feldstein and MBrck, while Oldfield (1977) found no such relation. 
It should not be surprising that such cross-sectional studies lead to 
conflicting inferences about the valuation of pension liabilities. It is not 
at all clear in what sense these equations can be said to identify struc- 
tural parameters of any interest. Standard financial theory postulates 
that the value of  a firm  (V)  may be expressed  either as the sum of 
assets (Ai)  and liabilities (Lj)  or as the present value of  future cash 
flows (CF,)  discounted at some rate s. These two alternatives may be 
written as 
(9) 
n  m 
v = 2  A; - 2  Lj 
i= 1  j=  1 
Note that neither of these equations includes an error term. The stan- 
dard procedure in estimating a cross-sectional valuation equation seems 
to be to deflate both  sides of  (8) by an estimate of the replacement 
value of the firm’s capital stock, insert proxies for whatever assets and 
liabilities are easily measured in the equation, and then try to adhere 
to the  spirit of  equation (9) in  adding to the equation measures  of 
earnings and earnings growth to cover for assets and liabilities which 
are hard to measure. Reasoning of this sort appears to guide the spec- 
ification of  Feldstein  and MBrck and the earlier work of Tobin and 
Brainard (1 977) upon which they rely. 
It is difficult to know how to interpret the error term in such a mongrel 
equation. Presumably it reflects unmeasured assets or liabilities. But 
since the opportunity cost of purchasing these assets (incurring these 
liabilities) is not being able to purchase measured assets (not incurring 
measured liabilities), it is hard to believe that the error is orthogonal 
to the included balance sheet variables.  Furthermore, since earnings 
depend on the assets and liabilities held by a firm, it is difficult to see 
how they could be orthogonal to the error term in the cross-section. 
As a consequence it seems very difficult to interpret the coefficients 
of equations such as those reported by the authors who have previously 
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every right-hand-side variable in  standard valuation equations is en- 
dogenous, adequate instruments do not seem to be available for esti- 
mating the parameters of  the standard hedonic equation consistently. 
Given these problems, instability in the estimated coefficients is not 
surprising. Even if the parameters of standard hedonic market valuation 
equations could be estimated consistently, serious problems of inter- 
pretation would remain. The standard procedure for using these equa- 
tions to answer questions about pension obligations involves focusing 
on the coefficient on the pension variables in the equation. For example, 
a coefficient of  minus one on the UVPL variable was to be interpreted 
as meaning that if  a firm gets an extra dollar in its pension fund, its 
value will rise by one dollar. 
This conclusion is unwarranted. If the firm contributes a dollar to 
its pension fund, current earnings are reduced by one dollar. Taken 
literally the Feldstein-MBrck equation implies that this decrement would 
reduce market value by almost $2. The presence of the growth variable 
makes  the  situation  even  more  complex.  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
simply looking at the pension variable will not be satisfactory. A similar 
problem of inference holds with respect to the R&D and debt variables 
in hedonic valuation equations. 
We  conclude that the standard hedonic equation approach is not a 
useful instrument for studying the market valuation of pension liabil- 
ities. In the remainder of this section, we modify the standard cross- 
sectional approach by  using only balance sheet variables  to explain 
firm valuations. The next  section uses an alternative variable  effect 
event study methodology to study the questions at hand. 
4.2.2  Modified Cross-Sectional Equations 
In the remainder of this section we estimate equations relating to 
market valuation of firms only to items that can be thought of  as ele- 
ments in their balance sheet. This avoids the problems of interpretation 
discussed in the previous section, although the possibility of inconsis- 
tent parameter estimates remains. In particular the equation we esti- 
mate is of the form 
V  UVPL  DEBT 
(10)  -  A  =  Po +  PI-  A  + Pz-  A 
where 
V = market value of firm 
A  = replacement cost of firm 
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BETA  = beta 
DEBT = market value of firm’s debt 
UVPL = unfunded vested pension liabilities 
Di  = two-digit SIC industry code dummies. 
Our data for 1980 and 1981 are constructed exactly as described by 
Feldstein and MBrck’s (1984) numbers with a few exceptions which 
are explained below. The reader is referred to the earlier paper for a 
detailed account of the data. Following Meyers’s (1983) comments, an 
unlevered  rather than a standard BETA is used here. We  also make 
use of  inflation-adjusted figures that have become available recently. 
In this study we use inflation-adjusted asset figures from the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s statement 33 (FASB 33). Our replace- 
ment cost number A  is the inflation-adjusted value of  property  plan 
and  equipment  plus  the inflation-adjusted  value  of  inventories.  Our 
pension numbers were taken from the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s  statement  36  (FASB 36). Pension  liabilities are adjusted to 
reflect a common discount rate of  7%. 
Dummies for two-digit industries are included  in the equation to 
capture the notion that different types of  physical capital are valued 
differently in the marketplace. The estimation results for 1979, 1980, 
and 1981 are shown in table 4.1.  Like the Feldstein and MBrck con- 
clusion the results for all 3 years suggest that firms’ market values do 
reflect their pension obligations. In each case the parameter estimates 
imply that firms’ market values are reduced more than dollar for dollar 
with unfunded pension liabilities, though the hypothesis PI = -  1 can 
never be rejected. 
Table 4.1  Balance Sheet Approach to Measuring the Impact of Unfunded 
Vested Pension Liabilities on Firm Valuation (Dependent variable: 
Market value over replacement cost V/A) 
1979  1980  1981 
Unfunded vested liabilities  UVPL/A  -  1.42 
(1.17) 
Leverage  DEBTIA  1.06 
(0.31) 
Research  RDIA  6.94 
(2.18) 
Beta  BETA  0.18 
(0.15) 
Constant  C  0.18 
(0.21) 
Sample  N  70 
R=  0.48 
-  1.54 
(0.70) 
(0.33) 
10.75 
(1.54) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.56 
(0.30) 
266 
0.39 
-  0.16 
-1.16 
(0.50) 
-0.32 
(0.21) 
7.58 
(1.12) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.68 
(0.15) 
256 
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One possible objection to these questions is the “weak firm” problem 
raised by Meyers (1983) in his comments on the Feldstein-MBrck paper 
and confirmed by Bodie et al. (1984) as an important effect. Firms with 
low value assets will tend to have low market values and because of 
financial pressure will tend to underfund their pension funds. As a result 
a spurious negative association between firm value and unfunded pen- 
sion liabilities may be observed. This is addressed in table 4.2 by using 
two different techniques. 
First, in the equations in the left half of the table a variable RATING 
is included, reflecting the firm’s Standard and Poor’s bond rating, is 
added to the specification. The RATING variable takes values ranging 
from one for firms rated D to 10 for firms ranked AAA.  It should be 
at least a partial control for weak firm effects. 
Second, in the second half of the table UVPL is treated as an en- 
dogenous variable and is instrumented using the firm’s total pension 
liabilities. The justification is that the total size of the firm’s liabilities 
is independent of  its funding policy, and so should be a satisfactory 
instrument. It obviously should also be correlated with the firm’s level 
of  unfunded  liabilities  and  so  should  provide  reasonably  efficient 
estimates. 
The results unambiguously and robustly point  to a negative  rela- 
tionship between a firm’s unfunded vested pension liabilities and its 
market value. Using either of our two procedures for controlling for 
weak firm effects, the absolute value of the UVPL coefficient actually 
Table 4.2  Balance Sheet Approach to Measuring the Impact of Unfunded 
Vested Pension Liabilities on Firm Valuation and the Weak  Firm 
Problem (Dependent variable: Market value over replacement 
cost VlA) 
1980  1981  1980  1981 
Unfunded vested liabilities 
Rating 
Leverage 
Research 
Beta 
Constant 
Sample 
R2 
UVPLIA  -1.92 
(0.93) 
(0.06) 
(0.54) 
RDIA  10.66 
(I 34) 
BETA  0.03 
(0.20) 
C  0.16 
(0.80) 
N  153 
0.45 
RATING  0.05 
DEBTIA  -0.06 
-  1.45 
(0.69) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
(0.30) 
7.43 
(1.37) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.48 
(0.33) 
147 
0.46 
-0.24 
-3.15 
(1.63) 
0.052 
(0.39) 
12.27 
(1.76) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
0.74 
(0.32) 
256 
0.41 
-2.38 
(1.15) 
0.39 
(0.24) 
8.15 
(1.22) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.65 
(0.17) 
257 
0.52 95  How Does the Market Value Unfunded Pension Liabilities? 
increases. While the standard errors are large, we are able to find no 
evidence that weak firm problems account for these results, suggesting 
that the market penalizes firms with unfunded pension liabilities. 
The discussion in the previous section suggested that the marginal 
effect of reduced pension liabilities may be different for underfunded 
than for overfunded plans.  The analysis of  section 4.1 implies that 
generally stockholders will gain more from a reduction in an already 
overfunded plan, because unfunded liabilities will be put in part to the 
PBGC and in  part to employees. We  address this issue by adding a 
variable PUT to the specification of equation (10). The variable PUT 
is defined as max (0, UVPL). Results are shown in table 4.3. 
Unfortunately, the data do not appear to be powerful enough to reject 
any interesting hypothesis concerning this issue. In the more reliable 
1980 and 1981 equations, there is very weak evidence that the availa- 
bility of  the pension put influences the marginal valuation of liabilities 
for troubled firms. 
A final major issue suggested by the discussion in section 4.1 is the 
role of other deferred compensation arrangements which may be cor- 
related with our included pension variables. Firms may have implicit 
contracts with their workers which require them to pay older workers 
in excess of their marginal products. If so, the capitalized value of these 
obligations represents a liability of the firm. This liability is of  interest 
in its own right. In addition, it is likely to be correlated with pension 
liabilities. 
Table 4.3  Balance Sheet Approach to Measuring the Impact of Unfunded 
Vested Pension Liabilities on Firm Valuation and the PBGC Put 
(Dependent variable: Market value over replacement  cost VIA) 
1979  1980  1981 
Unfunded vested liabilities 
PBGC Put Indicator 
Leverage 
Research 
Beta 
Constant 
Sample 
R2 
U VPLIA  0.75 
(3.64) 
PUT  -  2.65 
(4.21) 
(0.31) 
RDIA  7.02 
(2.20) 
BETA  0.16 
(0.16) 
C  0.23 
(0.23) 
N  70 
0.48 
DEBTIA  1.03 
-2.63 
(1 .SO) 
1.43 
(2.16) 
(0.33) 
10.65 
(1.55) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.55 
(0.30) 
266 
0.39 
-0.16 
-  1.59 
(1.44) 
0.61 
(1.44) 
-0.32 
(0.21) 
7.49 
(1.14) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.66 
(0.16) 
256 
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Unfortunately, there is no apparent way to construct an estimate of 
the firm’s deferred compensation liability. As a crude approximation, 
we added three variables to equation (8): AGE, SLOPE, and AGE  x 
SLOPE where AGE is an estimate of the average age of a firm’s work- 
force, SLOPE is an estimate of  the slope of its age-wage profile, and 
AGE x SLOPE should should enter the equation negatively. Firms with 
steep age-wage profiles and old  workforces should have the largest 
deferred compensation liability. The other variables cannot be signed 
on an a priori basis. 
Our estimates of AGE and SLOPE were obtained from a merge of 
the January and March  1978 Current Population  Survey tapes. This 
collection of data included the ages, wages, tenures, and three-digit 
employer industry codes for over forty thousand individuals. Param- 
eters of  an age distribution and an age versus log(wage) profile were 
estimated for each three-digit industry code. These codes were matched 
to the SIC codes on the compustat tape. In general a three-digit CPS 
industry code corresponded to a three-digit or in a few cases a four- 
digit SIC code. Each firm in our sample was thus assigned a wage-age 
profile corresponding to its SIC industry code. 
The results of estimating equation (10) with the additional variables 
AGE, SLOPE, and AGE x SLOPE are displayed in table 4.4. They are 
Table 4.4  Balance Sheet Approach to the Impact of Pensions and Labor 
Force Structure on Firm Valuation (Dependent variable: Market 
value over replacement cost VIA) 
I980  1981 
Mean age 
Slope of ageiwage profile 
Age and slope interaction term 
Unfunded vested liabilities 
Leverage 
Research 
Beta 
Constant 
Sample 
RZ 
AGE 
SLOPE 
AGE  x  SLOPE 
UVPLIA 
DEBTIA 
RDIA 
BETA 
C 
N 
0.05 
(0.04) 
144.44 
(67.09) 
-  3.78 
(1.74) 
-  1.99 
(0.90) 
-  0.39 
(0.39) 
11.06 
(1.87) 
0.08 
(0.  15) 
-  1.38 
(1.49) 
233 
0.40 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
(62.52) 
1.66 
(1.62) 
(0.61) 
-  0.27 
(0.22) 
7.90 
(1.25) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
1.82 
(1.30) 
234 
0.55 
-67.88 
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disappointing. The 1980 estimates are consistent with the hypothesis 
advanced above. The age-slope interaction variable is both satistically 
and substantively significant. However, its sign is reversed with equal 
statistical significance in  the  1981 equation.  As a  consequence, we 
cannot reach any judgment about the role of deferred compensation in 
affecting firm valuations. However, our results suggest that taking ac- 
count of  several deferred compensation liabilities does not alter the 
estimates of the influence of unfunded pension liabilities. 
4.3  Interest Rate Changes and the Valuation of Pension Liabilities 
This section uses an alternative methodology to circumvent some of 
the problems in the standard cross-sectional approach discussed in the 
preceding section. The essential insight underlying our tests may be 
illustrated as follows. Consider two otherwise equivalent firms, one of 
which has more pension  liabilities than the other.  Now suppose the 
nominal long-term interest rate rises unexpectedly. The firm with more 
pension liabilities should do relatively better than the firm with fewer 
liabilities because of the greater capital gain it experiences as the higher 
interest rate unexpectedly  erodes the value of  long-term obligations. 
By examining the response of firms with different pension obligations 
to interest rate changes, it should be possible to determine the extent 
to which the market values changes in the status of a firm’s pension 
fund. 
Because the approach taken here looks at the effect of an exogenous 
event, a change in the interest rate on the valuation of different firms, 
it does not depend on any assumption about how firms decide how 
much to fund their pension plan. Thus the variable effect event study 
method used here is not subject to the weak firm problem described 
in the previous section. 
More formally our approach  is as follows.  We  postulate that the 
return on firm i, in month t, can be expressed as 
(1 1)  pit  = ai  +  PiWt  +  Uit, 
where ai  is the normal required expected return on firm i and Pit reflects 
its sensitivity to interest rate news, here proxied by the change in the 
long-term interest rate, and  ui, is a random  error term. We  initially 
specify that pit depends on the firm’s characteristics at time t according 
to 
UVPL,  LTD 
Pit = Yo  + YIP  + Y2-  +  Zit~4  + Eitr  vi,  Vit 
(12) 
where UVPL represents unfunded vested pension liabilities. LTD rep- 
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detail below, and V is the equity value of the firm. Combining equations 
(1 1) and (12) yields the cross-section time series equation which pro- 
vides the basis for an empirical work: 
UVPL  LTD 
+ 72-  + ZirY41  (13)  pit  =  +  [YO  + YIP 
vit  vit 
+ Ujt + ARtE it. 
Equation (13) can be estimated, given cross-section time series data 
using ordinary least squares, to yield unbiased estimates of the param- 
eters. However, the error term does not satisfy the requirements for 
consistency of  the standard errors. In the results reported below we 
allow for the inclusion of firm and/or period effects in (13). This should 
make it possible to compute approximately accurate standard errors. 
Our procedure is entirely consistent in  spirit with the event study 
methodology that is widely used in financial economics. The approach 
involves  looking at the response of  securities prices to unexpected 
developments or “news”  in an effort to gauge the effects of the vari- 
ables being studied on firms’ market value. Our “variable effect-event 
study methodology”  represents an improvement over the techniques 
normally used in finance in two ways. 
First, the events we look at are developments that are exogenous 
from the viewpoint of the firm. A standard event study approach to 
the problem of studying how the market values firms’ pension liabilities 
would involve looking at how firms’ market value responded to news 
about their pension funding decision. The difficulty is that firms’ de- 
cisions are themselves responses to news or to privately  held infor- 
mation. It is not really possible to sort out the effects of policy changes 
from the independent effects of  their causes. Our indirect procedure 
of looking at the differential effects of interest rate changes on firms 
entirely avoids these problems. Second, our econometric procedure is 
superior to the grouping techniques normally used  in event studies. 
One could, as many financial economists would, group as firms by 
pension funding status and then look at how different portfolios  re- 
sponded to news about interest rate developments. Such a procedure 
simply discards information about within-group differences in pension 
funding status and therefore is inefficient. 
Before turning to a description of our data, it is useful to discuss the 
expected signs of the coefficient in (13) and possible biases arising from 
omitted variables.  We  expect y, and yz to be positive, reflecting the 
capital gains firms earn on their  nominal liabilities as interest  rates 
reduce  the value of  outstanding liabilities. The principal problem in 
estimating (13) is that some long-term nominal assets or liabilities which 
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might include the value of depreciation in tax shields or of prospective 
lease obligations. If these variables have a systematic impact on firms' 
pension  funding decisions, our results will  be  biased.  However, we 
know of  no previous arguments suggesting a role for these variables 
in pension funding decisions. They might, however, be related to the 
amount of long-term debt a firm decides to carry. 
In estimating equation (13) we use data for the 36-month period from 
January  1979 to December 1981. We  assume that pension assets and 
liabilities are constant within each year.'  Data on pension assets and 
liabilities are drawn from a tape provided by the FASB. Liabilities are 
adjusted to current interest rates using the rule of thumb described in 
Feldstein and MBrck (1983). Essentially, this procedure involves mul- 
tiplying reported liabilities by the ratio of the actuarially assumed in- 
terest rate to the actual market interest rate. This is done on a monthly 
basis.  The market value of  long-term debt is calculated from  infor- 
mation available on the Compustat tape. It is assumed that all debt 
reported as long-term by Compustat has a 10-year maturity and a 10% 
coupon rate. This debt is then valued using the monthly BAA interest 
rate. Monthly stock returns are drawn from the CRSP tapes. To  insure 
robustness, extreme values of the right-hand-side variables were elim- 
inated from the sample. All necessary data were available for about 
200 firms in  1979, about 470 firms in 1980, and about 400 firms in 1981, 
giving us a total of  12,715 observations in a 36-month sample period. 
The results of estimating (13) omitting any Z  variables are reported 
in table 4.5 for various specifications of the error term. In some cases 
Table 4.5  The Effeet of Interest Rate Changes on Monthly Stock Returns 
Reflected through Pension Assets and Liabilities As Well As from 
Long Term Debt 
Unfunded vested 
pension liabilities 
XAR 
Long-term debt 
XAR 
AR 
Constant 
Firm effects 
Month effects 
Sample 
30.6 
(10.4) 
-8.05 
(3.42) 
-  13.0 
(2.10) 
0.012 
(0.000707) 
No 
No 
12,563 
29.2 
(10.4) 
-  7.97 
(3.43) 
13.2 
(2.09) 
Yes 
No 
12,563 
29.1 
(9.10) 
-  3.41 
(2.95) 
86.1 
(6.84) 
No 
Yes 
12,563 
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a,  is treated as a constant, in others it is allowed to vary across firms, 
and in others to vary from month to month. 
The results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that the market 
values pension obligations rationally. In each case the unfunded liability 
variable is both substantively and statistically significant. The estimates 
in column 1, for example, imply that for a firm with unfunded liabilities 
equal to 10% of equity value, a 1%  increase in the interest rate would 
raise market value by  about 0.3%.  While this is only about half  the 
value that would be predicted by a naive model in which firms “owned” 
all unfunded liabilities and none of the other complicating factors dis- 
cussed in the first section arose, it seems very reasonable, especially 
in light of tax considerations. 
In all the equations the debt variable has the wrong sign, and it is 
highly statistically significant in equations (1) and (2). This finding con- 
firms the results of  French et al. (1983),  who were unable to find any 
evidence in support of the nominal credit hypothesis. It also supports 
the Modigliani-Cohn inflation illusion hypothesis. These surprising re- 
sults may alternatively be a consequence of our short sample period 
or of  our failure to measure accurately all  the firms’ nominal assets 
and liabilities. In any event, they stand as a major puzzle. We  recognize 
that it is implausible to assert, as our results  seem to suggest, that 
market participants recognize the effects of increases in interest rates 
on pension debt but not on regular balance sheet debt. But we do not 
at this point have any resolution to offer. 
Our results are somewhat less unsatisfactory for equation (3)  where 
month dummies are included in the specification. The unfunded pension 
liabilities variable remains statistically  significant in  (3),  although its 
substantive significance is much less than that suggested by equations 
(1) and (2). The debt variable, though it continues to have the wrong 
sign, becomes insignificant in equation (3). 
4.3.1  Further Tests 
A major problem with the cross-sectional valuation tests presented 
in  the previous  section was  the  “weak  firm”  problem.  Firms  with 
capital that cannot earn a high rate of  return tend to find themselves 
in financial trouble and try to underfund their pension plans. A negative 
relationship between firm value and unfunded pension liabilities is ob- 
served but may well be spurious. Both low firm value and underfunding 
of the pension liability are consequences of the firm’s ownership of the 
unprofitable assets. There is no reason  to expect a similar problem 
here. Weak firms should not be differentially affected by changes in 
the nominal interest  rate. However, as a further check we  added a 
variable AR  . RATING to equation (2) in table 4.5,  where RATING is 101  How Does the Market Value Unfunded Pension Liabilities? 
a categorical variable which ranges from one for firms whose debt is 
rated D to 10 for firms whose debt is rated AAA. The estimated equation 
was 
(14)  pit  = ai  + AR  *  [25.7 (UVPL) 
(14.0) 
- 22.6 (LTD) - 3.4 (RATING) + 20.31 
(6.2)  (1.6)  (14.2) 
While the RATING interaction variable enters significantly, it does not 
have an important influence on the pension variable's coefficient, which 
rises slightly. The introduction of RATING has little effect on the anom- 
alous debt coefficient. 
A concern in previous pension research has been whether the market 
responds to pension liabilities as measured at market or actuarial in- 
terest rates. The equations reported so far in this section assume that 
liabilities are valued at market interest rates. To test this assumption 
we  add  an additional  variable  to equation  (2) in  table  4.5 equal to 
AR(PLA -  PLM) where PLM  is the pension liability valued at market 
interest rates and PLA  is the pension liability valued at actuarial interest 
rates. If  the market responds to actuarial interest rates rather than 
market rates, one would expect that this variable would have a positive 
sign. The estimated equation was 
(15)  pit  = CX~  + AR  [13.6 (UVPL) 
(12.3) 
+  29.9(PLA -  PLY - 6.14 (LTD) -  12.5 1. 
(12.7)  (3.5)  (2.11 
This equation provides very weak evidence that actuarial interest rates 
influence market valuations. It appears that firms that overstate their 
pension liabilities by more gain more when interest rates rise. These 
results are in accord with the results obtained in the preceding section 
using a different methodology. They do also support the claim of Feld- 
stein and MBrck (1983) that market participants appear to use below- 
market interest rates in valuing pension liabilities. 
The results in the previous section provided evidence that the pension 
put and the possibility of bankruptcy influenced the market's valuation 
of pension liabilities. This issue can be examined by investigating whether 
interest rate changes have smaller effects for firms with large relative 
pension liabilities. This issue can be examined by investigating whether 
interest rate changes have smaller effects for firms with large relative 
pension liabilities. We  examine this issue by adding a variable  AR . 
PUT to our basic  equation where  PUT = max(0, UVPL). Our hy- 
pothesis is that the coefficient on this variable  will be negative  but 102  Jeremy I. Bulow, Randall Merck, and Lawrence Summers 
smaller in absolute value than the coefficient on (UVPL). This reflects 
the attenuated impact of interest rate changes on badly underfunded 
firms discussed in section 4.1 The estimation result was 
(16)  p  if  = (Y;  + AR  [33.7 (PL -  PA) 
(10.7) 
- 165 (PUT) - 6.9 (LTD) - 12.81 
(99)  (3.5)  (2.1). 
Although the coefficient on the put variable is statistically insignificant 
because it  cannot be  estimated with  any accuracy, its magnitude is 
consistent with our hypothesis. This evidence thus dovetails with the 
evidence in the preceding section on potential importance of the level 
of unfunded benefits. 
A final issue to be considered is the relationship between a firm’s 
pension arrangements and other parts of its compensation scheme. In 
the previous section we presented  some crude tests of  the idea that 
firms with steep age-earnings profiles and aging workforces were valued 
by the market as if  they had a formal debt liability to their workforce. 
While the results were inconclusive, taking account of this liability did 
not have a large impact on the estimated effect of pension obligations 
on firms’ market valuations. 
It would be desirable to examine these questions using the meth- 
odology of  this section. However, a serious problem presents itself. 
Any long-term implicit contract between workers and firms is likely to 
be formulated in real terms. The changes in interest rates which provide 
the basis for our tests largely reflect changing inflationary expectations. 
Separating out real interest rate changes in monthly data is probably 
not feasible. Hence we cannot in this section shed much light on the 
existence of  non-pension-deferred  compensation.  On  the possibility 
that interest rate changes over our 1979-81 sample period might reflect 
real interest rate variations, or that non-pension  long-term contracts 
might be nominally denominated, we reestimated equation (1 3)  with 
various wage growth and age structure variables included. In no case 
did they enter significantly or affect the magnitude of the pension coef- 
ficients. Therefore, no results are displayed here. We  reluctantly con- 
clude that this section’s method  cannot be used  to examine the im- 
portant deferred compensation issue. 
4.4  Conclusions 
The results in this paper confirm earlier analyses suggesting that the 
stock market valuation  of  firms reasonably  accurately reflects  their 
pension funding situations. This conclusion is reached using alternative 103  How Does the Market Value Unfunded Pension Liabilities? 
methodological approaches and data from several different years and 
so is reasonably robust.  In particular we  demonstrate that it is not 
simply a consequence of weak firm effects. Our results also suggest 
that the availability of the termination and the pension put influences 
the market valuation of pension liabilities. Finally, we provide some 
evidence suggesting that market valuations of firms reflect implicit con- 
tractual  liabilities to pay  older workers  amounts in excess of  their 
marginal products. These contractual liabilities appear to be denomi- 
nated in real rather than nominal terms. 
Our results provide no support for the notion that investors ignore 
pension liabilities in valuing firms. As a consequence, they suggest that 
corporate managers  will  benefit if  they fund  their plans  as fully as 
possible. Furthermore, they suggest that the private pension may not 
have a large effect on aggregate saving since both the asset and liability 
side of  pension balance sheets influence private savings decisions. 
Perhaps the most promising area suggested for future research is the 
market’s valuation of implicit contractual liabilities to older workers. 
It would be desirable to extend the tests reported here in order to get 
an estimate of the value of this liability. If  it were to be  significant, 
strong evidence would be provided  for incentive contracting models 
of the labor market. 
Note 
1.  An alternative  which we intend to explore would  involve interpolating 
net assets and liabilities within years. 
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Comment  Myron S. Scholes 
4.C.  1  Overview 
Is the question of whether unfunded liabilities of pension funds re- 
flected in stock prices an interesting question? We  would expect that 
these liabilities would  be reflected  in  stock prices.  Several  papers, 
however, address this question. Although we might disagree with their 
methodologies, these papers, on average, show that unfunded liabilities 
are reflected in stock prices. Most of the papers, including this paper 
by Bulow, Mqirck, and Summers, produce coefficients with such large 
standard errors that it is impossible to judge how accurately the un- 
funded liabilities of  pension funds are reflected in security prices. 
It is interesting that the coefficients are in the right  direction (for 
most years) given the difficulty of measuring unfunded liabilities. Not 
all firms disclose the duration of their liabilities. Simple adjustments 
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such as dividing the stated interest rate by  the then market interest 
rate could lead to large errors of measurement for many firms. Firms 
do not disclose their asset mix, the percentage of bonds in their pension 
fund. If the tax model were true, there is a differential impact on firm 
value depending on what proportion of the assets of the pension fund 
are  invested in bonds. Moreover, Bulow et al. ignore changes in funding 
policy. 
In most empirical tests in economics, it is difficult to test whether 
levels differ from equilibrium levels. As the authors note, it is necessary 
not only to value the liabilities and assets of the pension fund but also 
to model how investors value the entire firm. Although we can postulate 
a valuation model such as their model, it is not obvious that investors 
use their model to value shares. Most empirical success comes in the 
analysis of a change in policy. For example, how does a change in 
funding policy affect the value of shares? How does a change in the 
tax status of firms affect their share values? Is there a differential effect 
depending on the degree of unfunded liabilities? Is the change in status 
anticipated by market participants? These are examples of  ways  to 
discover whether the market adjusts to changes in variables affecting 
the pension plan. If there are price reactions to unanticipated changes 
in events affecting the liabilities of pension funds, we can argue then 
that  the  market  does recognize  the assets and liabilities of  pension 
funds. With this approach, however, we cannot be sure that the market 
reflects these liabilities fully. For prices to fully reflect these liabilities 
requires that investors would expect to earn abnormal profits if these 
liabilities were not fully reflected in securities prices. It is obvious that 
if  the liabilities were  not  incorporated  in  security prices,  investors 
discovering such discrepancies could profit by trading in such stocks 
and informing other investors that they also could profit from acting 
on these discrepancies. 
Bulow et al. do develop a new and important return test. They use 
changes in interest rates to test whether there is a differential effect 
on the value of shares of firms depending on the magnitude of unfunded 
pension liabilities. Unanticipated changes in interest rates should have 
a differential effect between firms with underfunded pension plans and 
those with overfunded pension plans. 
In all of their empirical tests, Bulow et al. conduct joint tests. They 
test not only for the effects of changes in interest rates but also their 
model of valuation. If their model is misspecified, the effects of interest 
rates might be lost or the interest rate variable could proxy for other 
variables not included in the analysis. These problems make it difficult 
to make strong statements about the import of the work. For example, 
in their stock market required rate of return regression (eq. [15]),  the 
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as explanatory variables  of  security returns. These omissions affect 
the interpretations of the magnitude and significance of the coefficients. 
4.C.2  Over Issues 
As I mentioned previously, the concern that stockholders would not 
take account of pension liabilities appears to be of limited importance. 
The Bodie, Light, MBrck, and Taggart paper in this volume tests ap- 
proximately the same issues as that of Bulow et al. but does it directly, 
not under the guise of testing the hypothesis whether the market rec- 
ognizes whether a firm’s pension fund is over- or underfunded. Bodie 
et al. test alternative models of  pension funding. Moreover, if  Bulow 
et al. can model the effects of pension liabilities, market participants, 
in their own interest, must be able to cause prices to reflect pension 
liabilities. 
In Bulow’s other papers, we are told that if pension plans are over- 
funded, the assets are those of the stockholders; if  underfunded the 
assets are those of the beneficiaries, and the liabilities are overstated. 
This differential allocation of the assets results in a nonlinear relation 
between funding and asset ownership. In the modeling in the paper, it 
is assumed that there is a linear relation between funding and benefits 
(costs) of the plan. The market price of shares cannot reflect a quantity 
that does not belong to the stockholders. 
The tax model in the paper is valid only if the pension fund is funded 
with bonds. If, as the authors state, the risk-adjusted returns on stock 
are less than the risk-adjusted returns on bonds (before tax), they have 
a badly misspecified model if  firms differ on the proportion of  bonds 
and stock held in the pension fund. The tax effect is trivial if the pension 
fund holds only stock. Bulow et al. do not explain why the firm holds 
other than bonds in pension account, or for that matter, why firms have 
unfunded pension plans. 
The cross-sectional regressions are most likely misspecified. They 
cannot  differentiate  among  the  various models:  the  tax  model; the 
rational market model with an implicit contract model; the irrational 
market model; the rational market model with employee-owned pen- 
sion plans. Throwing more variables into the cross-sectional regression 
will not separate among these various models. The regression coeffi- 
cient on the pension liability variable cannot be the same across all of 
the firms: it  cannot be independent of a firm’s particular choice of  a 
pension policy model. It is possible, for example, that for some firms 
the tax model dominates while for other firms the rational market model 
with an employee-owned pension plan dominates. These firms are not 
part of the same model as the other firms in their sample. The work 
assumes that all firms have the same weighing on each of the possible 
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choice of an operating policy (model) might be correlated. A cleaner 
test of whether the market accounts for pension liabilities is to study 
the effects of  changes in  stock prices  as a result  of changes in the 
funding and asset policies of pension funds. 
I do not understand the economic proposition that if unfunded pen- 
sion liabilities are not fully reflected in stock prices, equity owners will 
save less and consume more than in a world where perceptions were 
correct. Who consumes more? It would seem that the original stock- 
holders would have consumed more, thereby reducing the capital stock. 
It cannot be a continuing problem. Overconsumption might have oc- 
curred many years prior to the test period. Only further unanticipated 
and unreflected changes in funding levels could cause additional ab- 
errations in saving. In addition, if stockholders do not know, why should 
pension beneficiaries be more knowledgeable about the level of their 
savings? If they miscalculate in the same direction, they might increase 
their savings. On balance, it is difficult to predict the net effects of a 
failure to account for pension liabilities. 
I did not understand the asset value regressions. Using only balance 
sheet variables  tells us  very little.  The balance  sheet algebra is an 
identity. This is an accounting model, not a regression  model. There 
is no error in an accounting model. 
4.C.3  Interest Rate Changes and Valuations of Pension Liabilities 
In this section, the authors argue that changes in the rate of interest 
should have a greater effect on firms with greater unfunded pension 
liabilities. With unexpected increases in interest rates, the firm with 
greater liabilities should do relatively better than the firm with less 
underfunded liabilities because of the greater capital gain it experiences 
as higher interest rates erode the value of long-term pension obligations. 
Everything else being equal, this is true. To  run  a cross-sectional 
regression, however, is inappropriate because everything else is not 
held equal. The responsiveness of the value of each of the firms given 
a change in interest rates is not the same for a given level of unfunded 
pension liabilities. To  illustrate, consider a firm whose pension assets 
are invested in bonds such that the sensitivity of the value of its assets 
to changes in interest rates just matches the sensitivity of its pension 
liabilities. In this extreme case, the market value of the firm would not 
change with a change in interest rates. With differing amounts of match- 
ing of assecs and liabilities, the regression coefficient will differ inde- 
pendent of the crucial underfunded pension fund variable that is used 
as the independent variable in the regression. 
In selecting a single change in interest rates to capture change in 
value, Bulow et al. create another problem of misspecification. A ma- 
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a firm with younger employees. Bulow et al. assume parallel shifts in 
the term structure. Since this is never true, the model must incorporate 
the effects of  changes in the shape of the term structure and use the 
interest rate that most closely measures the change in interest rates for 
each particular firm. The debt variable in the model has similar prob- 
lems. The reason the debt variable is not significant may have resulted 
from a mismatch of the interest rate and the duration of the debt. The 
problem might be more severe for debt because of greater dispersions 
of duration and risk levels than for pension liabilities. 
In this discussion, I have concentrated on unanticipated changes in 
interest rates as affecting share value. Bulow et al. never distinguish 
between anticipated and unanticipated changes in interest rates in their 
tests of the model. If the stock market were to react negatively to an 
increase in interest rates, anticipations of changes in interest rates must 
already be incorporated in the price of the stock. This omission leads 
to an additional errors-in-variables problem. 
The paper is silent on how  V, the value of  equity, was determined. 
The reason this is important is that there is a significant negative relation 
between the  returns on  stock and  1/V. In deflating by  V to reduce 
heteroscedasticity, Bulow et al. might induce the negative relation be- 
tween returns and unfunded liabilities if  small firms (in market value 
of their equity) have greater unfunded liabilities. Care must be taken 
in using this variable as a deflator. The relation might be none other 
than a noisy replication of the standard negative relation between re- 
turns and l/V. 
4.C.4  Summary 
It is hard from the analysis in the paper to agree or to disagree with 
its conclusions. I believe from other evidence that the market does 
take account of pension assets and pension liabilities. I am never told 
why investors would ignore pension liabilities in valuing firms. I am 
never told how the fact that investors ignore these liabilities affects a 
change in the price of their stock. 
The more important discussion of  the paper is the realization that 
there are two models of pension equilibrium. One model is called the 
“explicit contract model”  (legal model); the other model is called the 
“implicit contract model.” A firm can operate with either model; both 
models, however, cannot operate at the same time for the same em- 
ployees in the firm. Until more evidence can separate when a firm is 
using one model or the other, it will not be possible to measure how 
completely the market reacts to underfunded liabilities. In the implicit 
contract model, the liabilities might exceed the measured liabilities (in 
the Bulow et al. model) by a large and variable amount depending on 
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I  agree  with  Bulow  et al. that  more  effort  must  be  expended to 
separate the explicit contract equilibrium from the implicit contract 
equilibrium. That effort is crucial for determining the effects of pensions 
on savings. Implicit contracts imply that the savings rate is far greater 
than the measured savings rate as determined by the explicit contract 
value of pension liabilities. 
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